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Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, defendant/appellant Marcia S. Merrill submits the 
following Reply Brief in the above-entitled matter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
CVF Land Investments claims that it is entitled to 
reimbursement of $13,000.00 in development costs expended on 
the Galloway property prior to redemption, since all 
procedures undertaken were mandated by Salt Lake City incident 
to a March 1, 1989 demolition order. CVF Land Investment bore 
the burden of proof of this claim, and failed to produce any 
evidence whatever to substantiate it. Neither the "Notice and 
Order" which CVF Land Investment attempted to introduce into 
evidence, nor the testimony of any witnesses, established or 
suggested that Salt Lake City Corporation ordered CVF Land 
Investment to pour 1,400 tons of fill material onto the 
property, level and grade the same, as part of a simple 
demolition project of one 800-square-foot clapboard house. 
POINT II 
CVF Land Investment improperly argues that 
defendant/appellant Merrill is attempting raise theories and 
issues for the first time on appeal. All arguments made 
pursuant to this appeal were either explicitly or implicitly 
before the trial court, and no new matter has been introduced. 
POINT III 
CVF Land Investment is in error in claiming that it 
is entitled to the value of improvements placed on the 
Galloway property, as it did not have notice of 
defendant/appellant Merrill's redemption rights. This claim 
is not only contrary to law, but to Gloria Ruiz1 own testimony 
during the hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO EVIDENCE WAS SUBMITTED BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT TO SUPPORT CVF LAND INVESTMENT'S CLAIM 
THAT IT WAS REQUIRED TO RE-GRADE AND RAISE 
THE GALLOWAY PROPERTY 
CVF Land Investment concedes in its responsive brief 
that the expenditure of $13,000 for re-grading and raising the 
entire Galloway property with prime-quality fill material 
would not ordinarily fall within the scope of Rule 69(f)(3) as 
a "reasonable sum" for "necessary maintenance, upkeep, or 
repair of any improvements upon the property". It argues, 
though, that the lower court properly awarded this sum as an 
addition to the redemption amount, as CVF Land Investment was 
acting pursuant to a direct "order" from Salt Lake City. 
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There was no evidence whatever presented to the trial 
court to support this claim.1 Neither the "Notice and Order" 
produced and offered by CVF Land Investment (Attachment 5 to 
Respondent's Brief) nor any other evidence offered during the 
hearing established, or even suggested, that in the case of 
CVF Land Investment, Salt Lake City made any departure from 
the demolition requirements spelled out in its own ordinances, 
much less demanded the sort of large-scale, extensive 
reconfiguration of the Galloway property which CVF performed. 
A. The March 2, 1989, Notice And Order Did Not 
Require The Re-Grading And Fill Work Performed by CVF Land 
Investment. 
CVF Land Investment relies wholly on a document 
entitled "Notice and Order", which it claimed justified the 
extensive grading, levelling and preparation work performed on 
the Galloway property. 
XCVF Land Investment's claim that its reconfiguration of 
the Galloway property was pursuant to order of Salt Lake City 
constituted an affirmative matter, raised in defense to 
defendant Merrill's claim that amounts expended were neither 
reasonable nor necessary. Accordingly, CVF Land Investment 
bore the burden of producing proof that its conduct was 
pursuant to City order--see In re Swan's Estate, 4 U.2d 277, 
293 P.2d 682 (1956); Jay Silversmith, Inc. v. Marchindo, 75 
N.M. 290, 404 P.2d 122 (1965); Morrison v. Reilly, 511 P.2d 
970 (Wyo. 1973). 
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To begin with, the document was never properly 
authenticated or received into evidence for the purpose of 
establishing the truth of its content. CVF Land Investment's 
attempt to introduce the document into evidence generated the 
following exchange: 
"Q. Okay. I show you a document and Ifd 
like you to tell me if you are familiar 
with that document and exactly what it 
is? 
A. It is a notice from the Sheriff's 
office, I guess, for Salt Lake to do 
that. 
Q. Have you seen that before; that 
document? 
A. I must have. I didn't bring my glasses 
and I can't really tell what I am 
reading. Very embarrassing. 
Q. Would you read what it says on the 
notice, at least the first --what the 
heading is on that document. 
MR. RAMPTON: Your Honor, I am going to 
object before the document comes into 
evidence or its contents. It needs to be 
offered. I believe this is a document that 
hasn't been authenticated. 
THE COURT: Well, sustained at this point. 
I don't think you should have her read from 
it until it's been admitted. 
MR. PETTEY: Your Honor, I'd like to submit 
for --
THE COURT: Any objection? 
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MR. RAMPTON: This appears to be a document 
supposedly issued by Salt Lake City 
Corporation. It is not a certified document. 
There is no certification on it. There is 
no authenticating witnesses to state that it 
is what it purports to be, so we object to 
its being received. 
MR. PETTEY: Mrs. Ruiz, I think you received 
it --
THE COURT: Right. It will be admitted; not 
necessarily for the truthfulness of its 
content, but to explain why she did what she 
did. (Transcript pp. 6-7) 
CVF Land Investment's "Notice and Order" was never properly 
authenticated, either by a subscribing witness or by any other 
means established by Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence; 
accordingly, it was not properly before the Court, and should 
not have been considered as an official document from the City 
at all. 
Even disregarding this lack of authentication, 
however, the "Notice and Order" nowhere requires, or even 
implies, that compliance therewith would entail the kind of 
massive re-contour of the Galloway property undertaken by CVF 
Land Investment. It observes that the Galloway property is 
"found to be in violation of the Salt Lake City 
Building/Housing Ordinances", pursuant to an inspection on 
March 1, 1989. The order then states that CVF Land 
Investment's option are (1) demolition; or (2) appeal. The 
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appeal process is briefly explained. Attached is a list of 
particulars in which the buildings on the Galloway property 
did not meet the Uniform Housing Code, which concludes by 
observing that "because of the above deficiencies, the 
buildings are determined to be sub-standard and dangerous and 
are hereby declared to be a public nuisance which must be 
abated by repair, rehabilitation, demolition or removal." 
Nowhere in the notice is a word said about regrading 
the property, or any portion thereof; about raising the level 
of the property, or any portion of it; or about performing any 
operation outside the scope of "demolition", the parameters of 
which are established by ordinances referenced and discussed 
in appellant's opening brief. 
Yet on the basis of this document (even assuming it 
were properly received in evidence), CVF Land Investment 
maintains that it was justified--in fact required—to expend 
seven times the necessary amount in the demolition and removal 
of structures on the property. The document simply fails to 
sustain the allegation, and is no evidence at all thereof. 
B. CVF Land Investment Presented No Other Evidence 
Whatever To Establish That Salt Lake City Required The Re-
Grading, Re-Contouring and Re-surfacing Of The Galloway 
Property. 
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Land Investment makes 1 Ir Hansen's "understanding *"y 
implausible, particularly given CVF Land Investment's failure 
to produce the alleged declarant of this critical piece of 
evidence to testify in his own behalf.2 
Yet the lower court, without considering corroborating 
evidence from the City itself and in the face of direct 
evidence to the contrary, assumed Mr. Hansen's "understanding" 
to reflect City requirements accurately, and concluded that 
2Due to the summary nature of a hearing to determine the 
proper redemption amount under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, defendant Merrill was not able to conduct any 
meaningful discovery of CVF Land Investment's theories prior 
to hearing. For this reason, defendant Merrill was unaware 
that CVF Land Investments was intending to allege 
representations by a City representative. Had advance notice 
been given, defendant Merrill herself would have produced the 
representative, for the purpose of denying the allegation which 
Mr. Hansen attempted to attribute to him. 
Defendant Merrill, did, however, produce an expert 
witness with extensive experience in City demolition projects, 
who testified that Mr. Hansen's "understanding" of City 
requirements was plainly in error: 
Q. Is there any requirement in the City 
that after a house is demolished, the 
entire lot must be changed in grade to 
that of the surrounding sites? 
A. No. 
Q. So if a house sits lower than a surrounding 
site, you don't have to fill that in as part of 
the demolition project? 
A. No. (Transcript at pp. 32-33). 
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Under the circumstances, all issues raised in 
defendant/appellant Merrill's opening brief must be deemed to 
have been expressly or implicitly before the lower court. The 
only possible exception would be Point III of the appellant 
brief, which addressed the "benefit" theory voiced by the 
trial court. Needless to say, this theory was not addressed 
or argued before the lower court, since it was first raised by 
the Court itself in the course of its final ruling. 
POINT III 
CVF LAND INVESTMENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE 
VALUE OF PRE-REDEMPTION IMPROVEMENTS BASED 
ON LACK OF NOTICE 
CVF Land Investment argues, at Pages 15-18 of its 
brief, that pre-redemption improvements to the Galloway 
property are ipso facto rendered "necessary" and "reasonable" 
(and therefore compensable pursuant to redemption) because CVF 
Land Investment had proceeded in good faith, without notice of 
defendant Merrill's intent to redeem. 
This argument directly contradicts Gloria Ruiz' own 
testimony: 
Q. Okay. Fine. Were there other items 
that you had anticipated doing to 
improve that property, besides the 
demolition work? 
A, I had thought that I would want to build 
onto it. That was my idea of purchasing 
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it to begin with, because 1 wanted to 
build. 
Q. You have not started construction on the 
premises? 
A. No, absolutely not. 
Q. Why have you not started construction? 
A. 1 was waiting to see what was resolved. 
It wasn't mine until — 
Q. You understood this property would not 
be yours until the six months redemption 
period was over? 
A. Yes. (Transcript pp. 9-10; emphasis 
added) 
In other words, CVF Land Investment had actual notice that, 
pending expiration of the six-month redemption period, its 
purchase was subject to the redemption rights of other parties 
to the lawsuit. That Marcia Merrill was one of these parties 
was a matter of public record, and well known to CVF Land 
Investment as such (defendant Merrill, in fact, was the only 
other bidder at the judgment sale on February 28, 1989, other 
than Mrs. Ruiz and the plaintiffs). 
The rule in such cases is stated in the very section 
of Corpus Juris Secundum cited at Page 16 of Respondent's 
Brief: 
One who purchases at a sale to satisfy a 
senior encumbrance, without notice of the 
existence of a person holding a prior 
encumbrance entitling him to redeem from the 
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sale, is entitled to compensation for 
improvements, but it has been held that he is 
not entitled to improvements in such a case 
where he had notice of the right of such 
person to redeem. 
15 C.J.S. §37(e)(2), page 645. 
It is for this reason that CVF Land Investment's 
attempted analogy to the Occupying Claimant's Statute, 57-6-
1, et seq. , Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) is inapplicable. 
That statute deals with the rights of a person who makes 
valuable improvements to real property under color of title, 
with no notice of outstanding claims of paramount title in any 
other person. 
Contrary to respondent's argument, Rule 69(f)(3) is 
not intended to protect those who construct valuable 
improvements on property subject to redemption By its 
wording, the rule is intended to permit a purchaser to 
maintain property during the redemption period—of which he is 
chargeable by law with actual notice—until redemptive rights 
have either been exercised or have lapsed. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue before the Court in this appeal is a simple 
one. The facts in evidence before the lower court establish 
that CVF Land Investment, between the February 28, 1989 
Sheriff's Sale and the end of the subsequent redemption 
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period, performed extensive grading and preparation work on 
the Galloway property which were not required, by ordinance or 
order of Salt Lake City or by any other reason, for the 
maintenance or upkeep of the property pending expiration of 
the redemption period. Nevertheless, the lower court ruled 
that, based on its misapprehension of Salt Lake City's 
requirements and upon defendant Merrill's presumed receipt of 
"benefits" from the work performed, CVF Land Investment was 
entitled to dollar-for-dollar reimbursement for all 
construction costs expended. 
It is submitted the Rule 69(f)(3) does not cast the 
aspiring redemptioner in the role of guarantor of all 
development costs incurred by the purchaser at a sheriff's 
sale. Accordingly, the lower court's ruling must be reversed, 
and the matter remanded for recalculation of the redemption 
amount in accordance with the uncontested evidence before the 
lower court. 
DATED this >_£ day of February, 1990. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN/ 
/ 
Attorneys for Defendant Marcia 
S. Merrill 
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I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or 
employed by the law firm of WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN, 310 South 
Main Street, Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in said 
capacity and pursuant to Rule 21(d) Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, a true copy of the attached Appellantfs Reply Brief 
was caused to be served upon: 
Jax H. Pettey 
180 South 300 West, #313 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
by depositing a properly addressed envelope containing the same 
in the U, S. Mails, postage prepaid thereon this 2^/ day of 
February, 1990. // 
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